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Lord: From the Editors

FROM THE EDITORS
In “Strategic Trust and Cooperation,” Vice Admiral Paul A. Maddison, Commander Royal Canadian Navy, provides a tour d’horizon of the emergent maritime
operational environment and the challenges it poses to the navies of the United
States and its friends and allies around the globe. In an arresting comment, he
notes that “the complex and dynamic interrelationships among influence, combat, and stabilization activities may lead to new and more adaptive approaches to
campaign planning, as well as more flexible command organizations at the tactical and operational levels both at sea and ashore. Fighting forces themselves will
undoubtedly become much more extensively networked to meet the demands
of a highly cluttered, confused, complex, and legally constrained battle space.” In
such an environment, moreover, it is even more imperative for nations to work
together to safeguard international maritime order, beginning with the deliberate
nurturing of what he terms “strategic trust.” Admiral Maddison’s remarks were
originally presented in the form of an address to students and faculty at the Naval
War College.
In “Command of the Sea: An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form,” Robert
C. Rubel argues that a proper understanding of command of the sea is essential
for a correct assessment of the role of the U.S. Navy in the contemporary strategic environment, particularly with a view to the challenge posed by the growing
“access denial” capabilities of the Chinese military. Insisting on the distinction
between (global and enduring) command of the sea and (local and intermittent)
“sea control,” Rubel makes the case that America’s formidable fleet of power
projection platforms—aircraft carriers, but also large-deck amphibious ships—
should be understood as having a vital role in maintaining command of the sea
on a global scale in the interests of safeguarding the increasingly interdependent
“system” of global commerce and communication. At the same time, this suggests
that they are not necessarily the preferred instruments for asserting sea control
in—most particularly—the South China Sea. The argument builds on previous
contributions by the author to this journal (“Talking about Sea Control” [Autumn 2010], “The Future of Aircraft Carriers” [Autumn 2011]). Robert C. Rubel,
a retired Navy captain, is currently Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval
War College.
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A complementary vision of a future maritime confrontation with China is
offered by Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. In “Between Peace and the
Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy,” the authors propose an alternative to the
emerging “Air-Sea Battle” construct being developed by the U.S. Navy and Air
Force, one that avoids deep strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland. Like
Rubel, Kline and Hughes favor reliance on attack submarines to deny the Chinese
sea control of the South China Sea, but they also make the case for developing a
new small surface combatant that, together with similar vessels of regional allies,
would constitute a “flotilla” (using the term coined by the classic naval theorist
Julian Corbett a century ago) to operate in the East Asian littorals in times of
peace as well as potential conflict. Captains (retired) Kline and Hughes, of the
faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, have both served on the Advisory Board
of the Naval War College Review.
There is little need to rehearse the litany of budgetary woes currently facing
the Department of Defense. In “Building the Purple Ford: An Affordable Approach to Jointness,” Robert P. Kozloski argues that the U.S. military’s quasireligious devotion to “jointness” today has caused it to turn a blind eye to the real
costs imposed by what he insists are the inherent inefficiencies of the joint system
in its various aspects. Concentrating primarily on the procurement process and
the military personnel system, Kozloski argues that both efficiency and effectiveness are often sacrificed to the real or perceived requirements of jointness. While
recognizing that the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act has genuinely improved
the operational performance of the military in important respects, he holds that
the problems created by the legislation in other areas can no longer be ignored in
the current fiscal environment. His most radical suggestions are the abolition of
most combatant commands in their current form, with the drastic reduction in
joint billets that this move would allow, and legislative reform that would limit
the number of officers in all services required to be joint certified.
Next, Iskander Rehman’s “Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean” revisits the Indo-Pakistani nuclear
relationship in the light of the growing trend toward the development or procurement by both sides of nuclear-capable sea-based platforms and weapons,
notably, the new Indian S-2 SSBN. Rehman warns that the unstructured and
volatile nuclear confrontation on the subcontinent could well become still more
dangerous if this trend continues, especially if accompanied by the eventual introduction of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines into the Indian Ocean.
In “Decided Preponderance at Sea: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought,”
Kevin Rowlands reviews the relatively scanty literature on naval diplomacy (a.k.a.
“gunboat diplomacy”) from the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan through the recent
studies of James Cable and Edward Luttwak. He argues that at the present, when
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“ballistic-missile defense at sea, theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, enforcement of no-fly zones, forward presence, and
global fleet stations are all forms of postmodern naval diplomacy,” more systematic thought needs to be devoted to the ubiquitous functioning of navies in
peacetime. This reminder is apposite at a time when the U.S. Navy is preparing to
revisit its fundamental maritime strategy for the current century, with its central
emphasis on maritime security cooperation. Commander Rowlands is a serving
officer in the Royal Navy.
War gaming has held a place of honor at the Naval War College since its early
days. Milan Vego reminds us that it has a much longer historical pedigree. In
“German War Gaming,” Vego traces the development of war gaming from its origins in ancient India through early modern Europe, its embrace by the Prussian
army in the late eighteenth century, its development under the German Empire
in the run-up to World War I, and its revival in the 1920s and ’30s. Of particular
interest is his account of German army gaming of World War I scenarios, and for
those with naval interests, German naval gaming prior to World War II. The central flaw of German war gaming was its consistent failure to address grand strategic or political factors; yet there is much here to stimulate productive thought
about contemporary war gaming. Milan Vego is professor of joint military operations at the Naval War College.
NEWPORT MONOGRAPH 38
The newest title in our Newport Papers monograph series—High Seas Buffer: The
Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979, by Bruce A. Elleman, of the Naval War College’s
Maritime History Department—is available for sale by the Government Printing Office’s online bookstore (bookstore.gpo.gov, or follow the link on the Press
website). It is also available on our website in PDF, downloadable to e-readers.
It tells the story of one of the longest naval operations in modern history—
officially lasting twenty-nine years, and in a real sense continuing to the present.
It was also one of the most successful, since, as a potent symbol of American
power, it ensured that frictions over the Taiwan Strait did not escalate into fullblown warfare. In fact, the Taiwan Patrol Force did its job so well that virtually
nothing has been written about it until now.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335,
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
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